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NOTE
IN SUPPORT OF THE FERES DOCTRINE
AND A BETTER DEFINITION OF
"INCIDENT TO SERVICE"
"[Tihe Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service."
-Feres v. United States1
INTRODUCTION
Jack Parker, an active duty member of the United States
Army, decided to move his family from their home near the Fort
Hood military base to a new location in New Mexico.2 He there-
upon borrowed a car from a civilian and requested a few days off
from the Army while he and his family moved.3 Permission was
granted, and at the end of his normal duty hours, Parker left his
post and drove toward the gate.4 Suddenly, an army vehicle pro-
ceeding in the opposite direction crossed the center line of the mil-
itary road and collided head-on with his car.5 Parker died from his
injuries, and his widow sued the United States for wrongful death.6
Carvel Gramlich, a petty officer in the United States Navy,
spent an afternoon ashore "on authorized liberty."7 A companion
drove him back to his ship, docked at a naval pier in New Jersey,
so that Gramlich could drop off some wood he obtained during the
day to make a model sailboat.8 After Gramlich returned to his
companion's truck, they drove along the pier roadway toward
1 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980).
'Id.
'Id.
'Id.
Id.
Camassar v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 894, 895 (D. Conn. 1975), afl'd per curiam,
531 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1976).
£ 400 F. Supp. at 895-96.
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shore.9 It was alleged that the defective condition of the road
caused the vehicle to veer off the pavement and plunge into the
water below.10 Gramlich drowned in the accident and his adminis-
trator brought an action for damages against the government.1
The circumstances surrounding both deaths are similar. Both
decedents were members of the Armed Forces and were excused
from duty to pursue personal endeavors. Both were killed driving
from their military posts, and both resulting suits were brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) based upon the gov-
ernment's alleged negligence. 2 Despite such similarities, recovery
was permitted in the former case, while in the latter it was held to
be barred" by the Feres doctrine, enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Feres v. United States.1 4 In Feres, the Court established
the principle that servicemen may not recover under the FTCA
when their injuries are incurred "incident" to military service."
Because the Court failed to define what it meant by a "service-
incident" injury, 6 however, inconsistent results often obtain in ac-
tions brought by military personnel seeking to recover under the
Act. For example, the Second Circuit found that Gramlich's
" Id. at 896.
10 Id.
21 Id. at 895-96.
" The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)-(c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110,
2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2671-2680 (1976), gives the district courts
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States. . . for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
18 Camassar v. United States, 531 F.2d 1149, 1151 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
14 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
15 Id.
16 Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd en banc, 643 F.2d 490
(8th Cir. 1981); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1980); Woodside v.
United States, 606 F.2d 134, 140 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
17 Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1979); Mills v. Tucker, 499
F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Stephan v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 323, 326-
27 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1281, 1284 (1973);
Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Cause of Action for Servicemen, 14 VAL. U.L. Ray.
527, 557-58 (1980); see Coffey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
aff'd, 455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972). Compare Preferred Ins. Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d
942, 944-46 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 837 (1955) with United States v. Guyer, 218
F.2d 266, 267-70 (4th Cir. 1954) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Snyder v.
United States, 350 U.S. 906 (1955).
FERES DOCTRINE
death occurred incident to his service because he was on active
duty and died at a military installation."i Consequently, the wrong-
ful death action was within the rule announced in Feres and not
cognizable under the FTCA. 19 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in
Parker v. United States, held that the decedent serviceman's
widow was not barred from recovery by the Feres doctrine.20 The
court ruled that Parker's activity--"merely passing through the
base on his way home" 21-was not service incident despite the fact
that he was on active duty and within the confines of a military
base when death occurred. 22
The Feres doctrine has been the subject of intense criticism by
courts and commentators alike.23 Legal writers have argued that
the doctrine should be abolished, asserting that the Supreme Court
did not adequately support the result in the Feres case, 4 and that
subsequent cases have departed from its underlying rationale.2 5 Al-
though frequently expressing distaste at the inequitable results
which it fosters, courts nevertheless have continued to apply the
Feres doctrine.2 6 This Note will reexamine the Feres doctrine and
some of the criticisms leveled at it. The Note will argue that, de-
spite assertions to the contrary, the Feres Court reached an argua-
bly correct conclusion. It will support this thesis by showing that
Feres' currently disfavored "analogous private liability" rationale
has been too readily discarded and is as valid today as it was in
1950.27 Additionally, the Note will demonstrate that the often
maligned "military discipline" rationale, standing alone, is suffi-
'8 Camassar v. United States, 531 F.2d 1149, 1151 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
19 Id.
10 Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980).
21 Id. at 1114.
2' Id. at 1113-14 & n.10.
23 Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Re-
covery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1099-1100 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, From Feres to
Stencel]; see Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1980); Thomason v.
Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955, 957 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Hitch, The
Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERS L. REv. 316, 333-34 (1954);
Note, Military Rights Under the FTCA, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 455, 472-75 (1969); Note,
supra note 17, at 529-30.
2 See, e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 535-53.
215 See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court and the Tort Claims Act: End of an Enlight-
ened Era?, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 267, 275-78 (1978).
26 See, e.g., Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
879 (1973).
27 See notes 94-115 and accompanying text infra.
1982]
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cient to support the Feres doctrine.28 Having confirmed the valid-
ity of these Feres rationale, the Note will suggest that the appro-
priate target for reform of the inequities wrought by the Feres
doctrine should be Congress, not the judiciary.29 Finally, the Note
will conclude that since the demise of Feres is not likely to occur in
the foreseeable future, the incident to service test should be used
by the courts to achieve more consistent results. Toward this end,
an improved definition of that test will be suggested.80
THE FTCA AND THE Feres DocTRINE
For many years, the doctrine of sovereign immunity31 pro-
tected the United States from incurring any liability to its citi-
zens. 2 One of the first fissures in this shield of nonresponsibility
25 See notes 116-136 and accompanying text infra.
2 See notes 137-144 and accompanying text infra.
o See notes 145-170 and accompanying text infra.
81 There are two theories as to how the doctrine of sovereign immunity evolved in
American jurisprudence. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17
(1926) [hereinafter cited as Borchard, Responsibility]; accord, Keifer & Keifer v. Recon-
struction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939). But see Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra
note 23, at 1099 n.4. One theory is that the American concept of sovereign immunity had its
roots in the English maxim "the King can do no wrong." Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort
Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAw & CoNTraP. Paos. 311, 311 (1942); cf.
Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COLUM. L. Rav. 722,
722 (1947) (doctrine has roots in "feudalism and theology"). That the King could do no
wrong was understood in early English common law to mean that he did not have a right to
do wrongs. Borchard, Responsibility, supra, at 22. In his commentaries, however, Black-
stone asserted that this phrase meant that the sovereign, because of his unique status, was
incapable of effecting a legal wrong. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CommiNTARmS 239, 241-43.
While there is support for the proposition that this was a misconstruction of the maxim, see
Armstrong & Cockrill, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 9 LAw & CoNTr. PRoBS. 327, 331
(1942); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 n.2 (1924) [hereinafter
cited as Borchard, Liability], Blackstone's view nonetheless became entrenched in English
common law. See Borchard, Responsibility, supra, at 31. The theory posits that this doc-
trine somehow was "carried over" into the American judicial system, despite the fact that it
was "wholly inapplicable" to the fervently anti-monarchistic new society. Armstrong &
Cockrill, supra, at 331.
The other theory which attempts to justify the existence of sovereign immunity in
American law does not rely upon the English maxim, and found its most emphatic advocate
in Justice Holmes. Borchard, Responsibility, supra, at 17. Holmes stated that the doctrine
was not founded on "any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and prac-
tical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); cf. The
Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (when government has not consented
to tort liability, it cannot be "guilty of a tort. For a tort is a tort in a legal sense only
because the law has made it so.").
32 Regardless of how sovereign immunity originated, cf. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruc-
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occurred when Congress established the Court of Claims to investi-
gate the merits of certain types of claims asserted against the gov-
ernment." This court was later given power to render judgment,3
but such authority did not create a source of governmental liability
in tort, for the Supreme Court found tort claims to be "exclude[d]
by the strongest implication" under the statute. 5 Indeed, Congress
later affirmed the Supreme Court's position by expressly excepting
tort actions from Court of Claims jurisdiction. Those who were
injured in tort, therefore, were relegated to the process of petition-
ing Congress to pass a private bill for relief.3 7 Eventually, the vol-
tion Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939) (the question is "academic"), Chief Justice John
Marshall stated in an early case that because the judiciary act did not authorize any suits
against the United States, none could be maintained. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) (dictum). Presently, it is well settled that the federal govern-
ment cannot be sued without its permission. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 586 (1941); Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882). Such consent must be obtained from Congress, for sovereign im-
munity "has become too firmly entrenched" in American common law to be abolished by
the courts. Armstrong & Cockrill, supra note 31, at 331; accord, Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S.
484, 500-01 (1967) (dictum); McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880); Gardner v.
United States, 446 F.2d 1195, 1197 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1018
(1972). When Congress allows suit by waiving immunity under a statute, it may attach any
conditions it wishes to that waiver. Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. at 501; International Eng'r Co.
v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 573, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976); accord,
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. at 440; see Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 125
(1883).
33 See Court of Claims Act of 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. M 1979)). This statute spoke of claims based, inter alia, "upon any
contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States." See id.
I See Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765 (1863) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 11 1979)).
35 Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275 (1869).
3s See Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(Supp. I 1979)). The jurisdictional grant to the Court of Claims now provides in part-
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated dam-
ages in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. M 1979) (emphasis added). See generally Anderson, Tort and Im-
plied Contract Liability of the Federal Government, 30 MINN. L. Rav. 133 (1946);
Borchard, Liability, supra note 31, at 28-29. Because Congress had not waived immunity
from suits grounded in tort, liability for these claims could not attach against the federal
government. Armstrong & Cockrill, supra note 31, at 331. Justice Holmes took this one step
further and declared that the United States could not legally commit a tort. See The West-
ern Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
37 Since tort remedies could not be obtained in the courts, claimants resorted to the
practice of petitioning Congress for relief in the form of private bills. Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd,
1982]
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ume of requests for private statutes based upon tort claims became
so large that Congress was compelled to act.38 The result was the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 194639 which contained the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act,40 a measure providing for a broad waiver of
the government's immunity from tort liability.41 The Act provides
that "[t]he United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions
of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. "42
This consent to tort liability, however, is not absolute, for there are
numerous statutory exceptions contained within the Act.43
Notwithstanding the fact that claims by military personnel
were not expressly excluded from the FTCA's otherwise broad
waiver of sovereign immunity," the United States asserted that all
claims of servicemen should be barred, citing "dire consequences"
337 U.S. 49 (1949); Note, Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation v. United States: An Ex-
pansion of the Feres Doctrine to Include Military Contractors, Subcontractors, and Sup-
pliers, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1218 (1978); see W. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL ToRT CLAIMS ACT
1-2 (1957). For a description of the procedure involved in enacting such bills, see Holtzoff,
supra note 31, at 323-25.
" E.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); see S. REP. No. 1400, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 7 (1946); S. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 24 (1946); H.R. REP.
No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1-2 (1945). By 1945, Congress recognized that the private
bill procedure was an inadequate vehicle for handling tort claims against the government-
For many years the present system has been subjected to criticism, both as
being unduly burdensome to the Congress and as being unjust to the claimants, in
that it does not accord to injured parties a recovery as a matter of right but bases
any award that may be made on considerations of grace. Moreover, it does not
afford a well-defined continually operating machinery for the consideration of
such claims.
Id. at 2.
" Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
40 The Federal Tort Claims Act comprised Title IV of the Reorganization Act, see id. at
842, and was designed to complement a provision in Title I, id. at 812, which prohibited the
introduction of private bills for claims cognizable under the tort claims procedure. S. REP.
No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 29 (1946).
41 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951).
42 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). Liability of the United States under this section does not
extend to payment of interest accruing prior to judgment, nor does it include payment of
punitive damages. Id.
43 One section of the Act provides that the district courts do not have jurisdiction to
hear, inter alia, claims based upon the execution of statutes or regulations, the performance
of discretionary functions of government, or those arising out of postal, revenue, customs,
treasury, or banking functions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). It further provides that claims
arising out of combatant activities of the Armed Forces during time of war, as well as any
claims occurring in foreign countries, are not permissible under the Act. See id.
44 See id.
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if liability were to attach.45  The Supreme Court, however, in
Brooks v. United States,46 interpreted the FTCA to include at
least some claims by military personnel. 7 In Brooks, two service-
men, on furlough, riding in a private car on a public highway, col-
lided with an army vehicle being driven negligently by a civilian
employee.48 In permitting the resulting FTCA actions to proceed to
trial, Justice Murphy, writing for the Court, found no indication of
a congressional intent to mandate a blanket exclusion of military
claims brought under the FTCA.49 Justice Murphy first noted that
the Act's jurisdictional grant did not clearly except military
claims.50 He reasoned that the express exceptions to federal liabil-
ity, which include combat-related and overseas claims, mandated
the conclusion that Congress intended military claims to fall
within the scope of the Act. 1 Also deemed persuasive by the Court
4 Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
46 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
'1 See id. at 51-52.
48 Id. at 50.
4" See id. at 54. In Brooks, Justices Frankfurter and Douglas dissented, relying upon
the rationale of the Fourth Circuit, see id., which denied recovery, see United States v.
Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 841-42 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). The Fourth Circuit
found the question of military rights under the FTCA a difficult one, primarily because of
"inept draftsmanship on the part of Congress in failing to make clear and express provision
as to soldiers in the United States Army." 169 F.2d at 842. The court noted that a literal
reading of the Act did not exclude military claims, but reasoned that such a reading of a
statute is inappropriate when it would result in a frustration of established policy and the
"real" congressional intent. See id. Brooks presented such a situation, and therefore, the
court "'look[ed] to the reason of the enactment and inquire[d] into its antecedent history
and [gave] it effect in accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing ... the literal
meaning in order that the purpose [would] not fail."' Id. (quoting Jefferson v. United
States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 712 (D. Md. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub
nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)). Viewing the statute from this perspective,
the court held that the Act did not provide a cause of action for the Brooks claim. See 169
F.2d at 846. The Fourth Circuit examined the same factors which the Supreme Court would
later find persuasive regarding service-incident claims in Feres. Compare 169 F.2d at 842-46
with Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140-45 (1950). See generally notes 66-80 and
accompanying text infra.
11 337 U.S. at 51. The Brooks Court noted that the statute gave the district courts
jurisdiction of "any" negligence action brought against the government, and reasoned that
there was nothing to indicate that this meant" 'any claim but that of servicemen."' Id.; see
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); note 12 supra.
' See 337 U.S. at 51. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), (k) (1976); note 43 supra. The
conclusion of the Brooks Court that Congress did not intend to create an exception for
military claims because no such exception was mentioned in the section of the Act which
listed exceptions, is an application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle of
statutory construction. This rule states that an express exception precludes implication of
other exceptions. See, e.g., George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 377 (1933);
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 128-29 (1923); 2A J. SuRr mD, STATUTES AND
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
was the fact that an exception relating to such claims was proposed
and later deleted before final passage of the statute.52 The existing
availability of administrative benefits to military personnel injured
by tortious acts posed no insuperable problem for the Court, for
neither the FTCA nor the veterans' laws provided for an election
or exclusivity of remedies.53 The Court refused to consider the con-
sequences of allowing tort claims grounded on poor military judg-
ment and the like,54 because the case did not raise such issues.55
The Brooks' injuries were "not caused by their service except in
the sense that all human events depend upon what has already
transpired. '58 The Court, however, implied that its analysis of the
Act would be different had the injury forming the basis of the ser-
viceman's claim been incurred incident to military service, 57 and
stated that the consequences of allowing such a claim could be so
"outlandish" that even the considerations pointing to governmen-
tal liability in Brooks might not be sufficient to support recovery
for service-incident claims.5
The following year, in Feres v. United States,59 the Court took
the opportunity to settle the question whether recovery could ob-
tain upon a service-incident claim under the FTCA. In Feres, the
Court disposed of three cases in one opinion.60 The first case in-
volved a plaintiff whose decedent, an active duty member of the
armed forces, was killed in a fire, allegedly due to the negligence of
the United States in quartering him in barracks with a defective
heating system. 1 The plaintiff in the second case had undergone a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 123 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973).
See 337 U.S. at 51-52.
5' See id. at 53. The Brooks Court was not blind to the fact that a serviceman would
receive statutory benefits for injuries incurred. It remanded the case for consideration of the
possibility of deducting benefits already received from the tort judgment. Id. at 54. The
Court noted that "[i]t would seem incongruous. . . if the United States should have to pay
in tort for hospital expenses it had already paid," but did not pass on this question because
it had not been argued. See id.
' See id. at 52.
See id.
8Id.
5' The Court stated that "[wiere the accident incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly
different case would be presented. We express no opinion as to it." Id.
Id. at 52-53.
' 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
See id. at 136.
6 Id. at 136-37. The Second Circuit had held that the plaintiff had no cause of action
under the FTCA. See Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1949), afl'd, 340
U.S. 135 (1950). The court distinguished Brooks, see notes 46-58 supra, because the instant
[Vol. 56:485
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stomach operation while in the Army, and discovered after his dis-
charge from the service that a towel was negligently left inside his
body.6 2 The third plaintiff alleged that her decedent died while on
active duty due to negligent treatment by army surgeons.6 3 In dis-
tinguishing Brooks, the Feres Court stated that the common ele-
ment in each of the situations presented in Feres was that the ser-
vicemen, "while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained
injury due to negligence of others in the Armed Forces."'"
In an opinion by Justice Jackson, the Court held that the gov-
ermnent was not liable under the FTCA for service-incident
claims.6 5 As in Brooks, the Court looked to the intent of Congress,
but Justice Jackson did not merely search for possible "outlandish
consequences" of liability.6 Instead, he attempted to harmonize
the Act with "the entire statutory system of remedies against the
Government to make a workable, consistent and equitable
whole. 6e7 Briefly restating the considerations leading to the Brooks
case involved an injury incurred incident to service. 177 F.2d at 536-37. The Second Circuit
court noted the absence of an express exclusion of military claims under the Act, see id; 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (1976); but reasoned that this could be explained by the fact that such an
exception was unnecessary. See 177 F.2d at 537-38. The court also implied that the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, see note 51 supra, did not apply since the statutory
exceptions related to types of claims, not classes of claimants. See 177 F.2d at 537. Finally,
the circuit court observed that if Congress intended any remedy beyond the military bene-
fits scheme, it would have expressly provided for one. Id.
62 340 U.S. at 137. Denying the plaintiff recovery under the Act, the district court in
this case applied much of the reasoning that was later used by the Supreme Court in Feres.
Compare Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-46 (1950) with Jefferson v. United
States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711-14 (D. Md. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), affld sub
nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
13 340 U.S. at 137. The Tenth Circuit in this case had held that service-incident claims
were cognizable under the FTCA, see Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 3 (10th Cir. 1949),
rev'd sub noma. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), reasoning that such claims were
not within any of the statutory exceptions, and noting that the absence of such a provision
in light of previous proposed bills was persuasive, 178 F.2d at 3. The conflict between the
Second, Fourth and Tenth Circuits led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and decide the
three cases together. 340 U.S. at 136.
340 U.S. at 138.
65 Id. at 146. The decision in Feres was unanimous. Justice Douglas concurred in the
result. See id.
" See id. at 139; note 143 infra.
67 340 U.S. at 139. It is submitted that a comparison of the Brooks and Feres opinions
reveals two distinct methods of statutory interpretation. Justice Jackson, in Feres, remarked
that the FTCA "was not an isolated and spontaneous flash of congressional generosity." Id.
Hence, he felt it appropriate to fit the Act into the general scheme of remedies and benefits
obtainable from the United States. Id. In Brooks, however, Justice Murphy simply noted
the absence of express exclusivity or election provisions, and thus, allowed recovery. Brooks
v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949). Justice Murphy also refused to examine other rem-
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result,68 the Feres Court nonetheless mentioned other factors
which it found more persuasive of congressional intent to maintain
sovereign immunity from service-incident tort claims.09 A primary
purpose of the FTCA, the Court observed, was to relieve Congress
of the burden of examining tort claims and passing private acts
when it found that relief was warranted.70 Justice Jackson sug-
gested that Congress had not been deluged with private bills for
servicemen prior to the enactment of the FTCA because military
personnel already had available to them a comprehensive scheme
for relief through disability and veterans' benefits.7 1 Reasoning
that the purpose of the Act was to extend a judicial remedy to
those with no relief, he concluded that Congress did not intend to
afford to servicemen the additional remedy of an FTCA claim. 2
Justice Jackson further opined that if Congress had wished to en-
act another device for the satisfaction of military claims, it would
have provided a method to harmonize the two schemes to prevent
potential double recovery.73 The Court looked to the statute's ju-
edies to decide if there should be a set-off for benefits already received, because the question
was not fully argued below. Id. at 53-54.
08 See 340 U.S. at 138-39; notes 49-53 supra.
6' See notes 70-80 and accompanying text infra.
70 340 U.S. at 140; see notes 37-38 supra. The report of the joint committee on the
organization of Congress described the difficulty that private bills had caused:
Congress is poorly equipped to serve as a judicial tribunal for the settlement
of private claims against the Government of the United States. This method of
handling individual claims does not work well either for the Government or for
the individual claimant, while the cost of legislating the settlement in many cases
far exceeds the total amounts involved.
Long delays in consideration of claims against the Government, time con-
sumed by the Claims Committee of the House and Senate, and crowded private
calendars combine to make this an inefficient method of procedure.
The United States courts are well able and equipped to hear these claims and
to decide them with justice and equity both to the Government and to the claim-
ants. We, therefore, recommend that all claims for damages against the Govern-
ment be transferred by law to the United States Court of Claims and to the
United States district courts for proper adjudication.
S. REP. No. 1010, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 25 (1946).
71 See 340 U.S. at 140.
71 See id.
73 See id. at 144. The Court noted that the availability of other compensation could
lead to four conclusions-that the claimant could obtain a double recovery, that he could
elect to receive either the tort recovery or the statutory benefits, that he could look to both,
deducting one recovery from the other, or that the claimant would be precluded from tort
recovery because of the accessibility of the benefits. See id. There was authority for all four
propositions, but the Court chose the last. See id. There was no attempt in the opinion to
explain why the Brooks Court arrived at a different choice. See note 53 and accompanying
text supra.
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risdictional grant, as did Justice Murphy in Brooks, 74 but reasoned
that although this provision is unqualified in that it refers to "any
claim,) 75 a grant of power to hear cases is not equivalent to a state-
ment that all claims must be allowed to proceed. According to
the FTCA's language, Justice Jackson stated, the test of permissi-
ble claims is whether the liability sought to be imposed is analo-
gous to that which would attach in a suit against a private individ-
ual.7 7 In addition, the Justice observed that, pursuant to the
FTCA, the tort liability of the United States must occur "under
like circumstances" as would create private liability.78 The Court
declared that such similar circumstances did not exist in Feres be-
cause private parties cannot exercise the kind of control over per-
sons that the Army wields over servicemen.79 Another rationale ad-
vanced by the Feres Court in support of its holding was the fact
that since the government's association with those in the Armed
Forces is federal in nature, it would be anomalous to hold that
Congress intended that state law should control the substantive
rights of servicemen injured incident to that relationship.80
After Feres was decided, there was some speculation that it
See 340 U.S. at 140-41; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976); note 12 supra.
75 See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949); note 50 supra.
76 340 U.S. at 141. The Court noted that a grant of jurisdiction "is necessary to deny a
claim on its merits as a matter of law as much as to adjudge that liability exists." Id.
77 Id.; see notes 94-110 and accompanying text infra.
78 340 U.S. at 141-42 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976)); see notes 111-115 and accompa-
nying text infra.
79 See 340 U.S. at 141-42.
80 See id. at 143-44. Notably, in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947),.
the Supreme Court was faced with an indemnification claim by the government for amounts
spent for, inter alia, medical treatment for a soldier who had been injured by the defendant
tortfeasor. Id. at 302. The Court applied federal, rather than state law, reasoning that:
Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more distinc-
tively federal in character than that between it and members of its armed forces.
To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations between [members
of] the armed forces and persons outside them. . . , the scope, nature, legal inci-
dents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and the Gov-
ernment are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal
authority.
Id. at 305-06 (citations omitted) (quoted in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. at 143-44). The
Feres Court recognized this federal relationship and concluded that no federal law provided
for claims incident to military service. 340 U.S. at 144. The Court observed that servicemen
on active duty must go anywhere they are told. See id. at 143. The Court reasoned, there-
fore, that it would be improper to permit the fortuity of the location of the tort govern the
substantive rights and liabilities of the parties to this federal relationship. See id.; cf. 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) (the law of the place governs under the FTCA).
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had either overruled or severely limited the Brooks holding. 1 The
Supreme Court ended that uncertainty in United States v.
Brown8 2 by making it clear that Feres merely distinguished
Brooks.e3 In Brown, a discharged veteran was permanently injured
when a defective tourniquet was applied to his leg during a knee
operation in a VA hospital.8 Justice Douglas, writing for the ma-
jority, noted that Brown was a civilian at the time he was injured,
and thus, his case was closer to the facts presented in Brooks than
those in Feres.85 Brooks was said to control because Brown's inju-
ries were not incurred incident to his military service.88 Although
Justice Jackson noted that the reasons advanced to bar claims
arising incident to service were available to the Brooks Court,8 7
these factors could be used to support liability in Feres "only by
ignoring the vital distinction" that one case'dealt with service-inci-
dent claims while the other did not.88 Unfortunately, however, this
"vital" criterion was left undefined by the Court.
Because there are no clear guidelines for defining the scope of
the incident to service test which formed the crucial distinction be-
tween Feres and Brooks, it is unclear in many cases whether a ser-
viceman will be barred from recovery under the FTCA.89 More-
over, many commentators have questioned the validity of the
rationale underlying the Feres doctrine.90 Thus, before an analysis
of the incident to service test can be attempted, the Feres doctrine
itself must be reassessed. In this regard, some commentators have
stated that the Feres decision clearly was incorrect in light of prin-
8 Mason v. United States, 568 F.2d 1135, 1136 (5th Cir. 1978); see, e.g., Zoula v. United
States, 217 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1954); cf. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Supreme Court later confirmed that Feres did not overrule Brooks).
82 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
See id. at 112.
8, See id. at 110-11.
Id. at 112. In distinguishing Feres, the Brown Court stated that Brown's injury "was
not incurred while [he] was on active duty or subject to military discipline." Id.
08 Id. The Court conceded that Brown was in the VA hospital because of his military
service. See id. Justice Black, joined by Justices Reed and Minton, dissented, reasoning that
Brown's injury was "inseparably related to military service." See id. at 114 (Black, J., dis-
senting). Thus, Justice Black asserted, the case fell directly within the Feres rule. "But for
his army service [Brown] could not have been injured in the veterans hospital as he was
eligible . . . for treatment there solely because of . . .veteran status." Id. (Black, J.,
dissenting).
81 See 340 U.S. at 146.
88 See id.
88 See notes 1-22 and accompanying text supra; note 148 and accompanying text infra.
o See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
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ciples of statutory construction."' As Justice Jackson recognized,
however, statutory interpretation is not an exact science, for the
inquiry focuses upon the intent of a collective body of legislators
whose thoughts on the subject at hand remain largely unex-
pressed.9 2 Working from "clues," the Feres Court attempted to as-
certain that collective intention."3 It is submitted that an arguably
correct result was reached.
PRIVATE LIABmIITY UNDER LIKE CIRCUMSTANCES
In defining the scope of the FTCA's waiver of immunity, the
Feres Court looked to the language of the Act, which subjects the
United States to the same measure of liability as would confront a
private individual under like circumstances. 4 Addressing the re-
quirement of "like circumstances," the Court found the Feres
claims to be lacking, reasoning that private persons do not possess
"such authorit[y] over persons as the Government vests in the ech-
elons of command.19 5 The Court further noted that analogous lia-
bility also was absent because "no American law. .. ever has per-
mitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his
superior officers or the Government."9 6 Attempting to prove its
point by way of example, the Court observed that, even if a state
were considered a private person, the private liability under like
circumstances mandated by the FTCA still would be lacking be-
cause states uniformly were immune from liability to militiamen.97
Unfortunately, in Dalehite v. United States,98 the Court ap-
plied its analogous private liability rationale in a nonmilitary con-
text, thereby immunizing the federal government from liability for
all torts arising out of uniquely governmental activities.9 In
Dalehite, the Coast Guard had failed to extinguish a fire caused by
an explosion of fertilizer. 100 Upon noting the absence of an analo-
:I See, e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 535-53.
92 See E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 163, at 251-56 (1940); 2A J.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 51, § 45.06, at 19-20.
3 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 770
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950).
"Id. at 141-42.
6 Id. at 141.
7 Id. at 142.
346 U.S. 15 (1953).
"Id. at 44.
100 Id. at 43. The primary issue in Dalehite was whether the government's allegedly
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gous private duty to fight fires, the Court held that the government
could not be held accountable for the Coast Guard's negligence. 10 1
The Dalehite Court's narrow interpretation of the FTCA was
overruled in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 02 wherein the
Supreme Court observed that "all Government activity is inescap-
ably 'uniquely governmental' in that it is performed by the Gov-
ernment."103 To hold that the FTCA does not extend to any acts
performed by the government, the Court reasoned, would create a
"finespun and capricious" distinction which would frustrate the
Act's objective of reducing private bills and relieving the injustices
caused by sovereign immunity.1 04
Interestingly, critics of the Feres doctrine seized upon the In-
dian Towing decision as support for their contention that one of
the fundamental pedestals upon which the Feres decision rested,
namely, the absence of analogous private liability in the military
context, had been discredited.105 It is submitted, however, that the
negligent storage of combustible materials was excluded from the purview of the FTCA by
the "discretionary function" exception. Id. at 32-36; see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). Since
the Coast Guard's alleged negligence also involved its failure to extinguish a fire, however,
the Court was required to construe the private liability "under like circumstances" language
of the Act. See 346 U.S. at 43-44. Notably, the Court felt that the instant case presented a
"much stronger" case for finding a lack of analogous liability than did Feres. Id. This obser-
vation was based upon the fact that while public bodies always had been immune from
liability for injuries caused in the course of fighting fires, the Feres Court had pointed to
only one instance in which recovery expressly had been denied to state militiamen. Id.; see
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950).
101 346 U.S. 15, 44 (1953).
102 350 U.S. 61 (1955); cf. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957)
(Indian Towing case "rejected" the uniquely governmental activity theory enunciated in
Dalehite).
103 350 U.S. at 67. In Indian Towing, shipowners sued under the FTCA alleging that
the Coast Guard's negligent operation of a lighthouse had caused their ship to run aground.
See id. at 61-62. The government contended that the language of the FTCA demonstrated
that Congress did not intend to waive immunity from tort claims arising out of governmen-
tal activities which private persons did not perform. Id. at 64. The Court found this asser-
tion faulty because the statutory language mentioned federal liability "under like circum-
stances" and did not require private liability under the "same" circumstances. See id. at 64-
65. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). The Court did not criticize the apparently contra-
dictory conclusion in Feres; it merely distinguished the case as involving military claims.
See 350 U.S. at 69.
104 350 U.S. at 68.
105 See, e.g., 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 155.05, at 5-89 (1979);
Jacoby, supra note 17, at 1286-87; Note, supra note 25, at 276; Note, From Feres to Stencel,
supra note 23, at 1103-04; Note, supra note 17, at 542. Commentators also have asserted
that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963), has cast
doubt upon the validity of the Feres doctrine. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 17, at 1286-87.
In Muniz, the Court refused to extend the Feres bar to the tort claims of federal prisoners.
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Dalehite and Indian Towing decisions must be read together. In-
deed, it appears that the Supreme Court's decision in Dalehite was
an aberration which, shortly thereafter, its Indian Towing decision
rectified. Surely, therefore, Indian Towing is of limited signifi-
cance: it merely resolved a problem posed by Dalehite; it neither
altered the fact that there is no private analogy to military service,
nor undermined the propriety of the Feres Court's transformation
of such fact into a rationale in support of its decision.
It is further suggested that neither the activities nor the
uniquely governmental function of the military led the Feres Court
to conclude that no analogous private liability existed in the case
of service-incident injuries. Rather, it appears that the very status
of the military was determinative in persuading the Court that ser-
vice-incident claims were not intended by Congress to be cogniza-
ble under the FTCA.10 6 Support for this interpretation of Feres is
found in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,0 7 a re-
cent case in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of
the Feres doctrine.08 In Stencel, the Feres bar was extended to
indemnity actions by third. parties for money paid to military per-
sonnel who could not recover directly from the government.209 Not-
ing that the military relationship "is unlike any relationship be-
tween private individuals," the Court reasoned that "at least a
surface anomaly" arises in attempting to fit a serviceman's service-
incident injury within the language of the Act. 10
Surprisingly, the Feres decision has been criticized for the
very fact that it considered military status as a "circumstance" to
be considered"' when looking to the FTCA's "like circumstances"
374 U.S. at 159. As a ground for its decision, the Court stated that "the Government's liabil-
ity is no longer restricted to circumstances in which government bodies have traditionally
been responsible for misconduct of their employees." Id. Nevertheless, the Court noted that
it had "no occasion to question Feres," but simply found that its rationale was "not compel-
ling" in the context of federal prisoners. Id.
106 After the Indian Towing Court rejected the proposition that uniquely governmental
activities cannot form the basis for FTCA suits, it distinguished Feres. 350 U.S. at 69. The
Court, in doing so, cited the military relationship as the distinguishing factor. Id.
10 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
101 Id. at 670.
109 Id. at 673.
11 Id. at 670-71. Significantly, although Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in
Stencel, they did not attack the validity of Feres. Instead, they disagreed with the Court's
extension of the doctrine to indemnity actions. Id. at 674-77 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
" Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950).
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language. 112 Given that the FTCA expressly provides for liability
"under like circumstances," 113 however, it would be unreasonable
not to consider this requirement, irrespective of commentators' as-
sertions to the contrary. Indeed, if Congress had not intended
these words to qualify the general statement that the government
"shall be liable,"114 it is difficult to imagine why they were included
in the Act.
Of course, should one consider "only a part of the circum-
stances [of military service] and ignore the status of the wronged
and wrongdoer," it is arguable that service-incident torts are simi-
lar to those visited by a doctor upon his patient, or by a landlord
upon his tenant.11 5 It is suggested, however, that when the military
command relationship is injected into these situations, the similar-
ities become tenuous. No doctor orders his patient to undergo ex-
aminations. Similarly, no landlord directs his tenant to remain in
his quarters until told otherwise. Thus, it is submitted that the
correlative elements of command and obedience, unique to the mil-
itary relationship, remove service-incident claims from the purview
of the FTCA. In addition, as the following section of this Note will
demonstrate, the desirability of preserving this disciplinary rela-
tionship, standing alone, would have been sufficient to support the
Feres Court's conclusion.
MILITARY DISCIPLINE-THE HEART OF Feres
In Brown, the Supreme Court commented upon what it per-
ceived to be the primary rationale behind the Feres doctrine. Jus-
tice Douglas, writing for the majority, stressed the following factors
as having led the Court to exclude service-incident tort claims
from the ambit of the FTCA: the "special relationship" between
1" See Note, supra note 17, at 540.
113 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). Even the Indian Towing Court recognized that one
purpose of the FTCA "was to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of gov-
ernmental activities in circumstances like unto those in which a private person would be
liable." Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955) (emphasis added).
114 Some commentators assert that the FTCA can be interpreted as imposing liability
on the federal government which is "co-extensive" with the liability of private persons. See,
e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 536. It is submitted, however, that this should only be true to
the extent that there are "like circumstances," for these words are contained within the
express language of the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). It is a basic rule of statutory
interpretation that the words of an enactment are to be given effect unless a contrary ap-
proach cannot be avoided. See E. CRAwFORD, supra note 92, § 200, at 347-48.
"5' See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950).
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the government and its soldiers, "the effects of the maintenance of
such suits upon discipline," and the "extreme results" that might
obtain from such claims.11
Some commentators have suggested that the "discipline ratio-
nale" represents an attempt by the Brown Court to bolster what it
perceived to be the weak basis for the Feres doctrine.117 It appears,
however, that this "new" rationale, while not expressly articulated
in Brooks or Feres, clearly is implicit in the language of these
cases. Justice Murphy, in Brooks, for example, stated that the
"outlandish" consequences of tort claims based upon "[a] battle
commander's poor judgment, an army surgeon's slip of hand, [or] a
defective jeep which causes injury" could lead the Court in a sub-
sequent case to bar service-incident claims.1 8 Moreover, the Feres
opinion consistently referred to the unique nature of the military
relationship in terms which clearly reflected the Court's acknowl-
edgment of the importance of discipline. Among other things, Jus-
tice Jackson recognized the authority that the government wields
over servicemen via the chain of command," 9 noted that military
personnel must serve wherever they are ordered to serve, 20 and
distinguished Brooks on the ground that the relationship of the
serviceman "was not analogous to that of a soldier while perform-
ing duties under orders." 121
It is submitted that the discipline rationale provides a compel-
ling reason for excluding service-incident claims from the ambit of
the FTCA. The government's right to command and the soldier's
duty to obey must be unquestioned if the military organization is
to function effectively. 2 2 The rights of military personnel some-
16 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
11 See, e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 555.
I's Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1949).
119 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950).
220 Id. at 143.
121 Id. at 146.
22 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974) (quoting In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153
(1890)); accord, Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975). In Schlesinger, the
Court stated:
To provide for and perform its vital role, the military must insist upon a respect
for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life. The laws and tradi-
tions governing that discipline have a long history;, but they are founded on
unique military exigencies as powerful now as in the past. Their contemporary
vitality repeatedly has been recognized by Congress.
Id. See also Blameuser v. Andrews, 630 F.2d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1980). Notably, allowing
FTCA suits for service-incident claims might deleteriously affect the maintenance of mili-
tary discipline because those charged with enforcing discipline could be considered "causa-
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times must be subordinated to the objective of an efficient com-
mand structure.12 Therefore, when a statute can affect the com-
mand relationship, the courts must exercise caution to avoid a
construction which would "circumscribe the authority of military
commanders to an extent never intended by Congress. 12 4 More-
over, if a particular interpretation of an enactment would harm the
command relationship, such a construction must be necessary to
further the legislative purpose. 25 Hence, the Feres doctrine stands
as good law: given that the purpose of the FTCA was to reduce
the burden upon Congress of private bills,12 and given that such
tive agents" of such claims. Coffey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972); accord, Brooks v. United States, 337
U.S. 49, 52 (1949); see Stencel Aero Eng'r Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977);
Torres v. United States, 621 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1980); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 594 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969); Preferred Ins. Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d 942,
944 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 837 (1955). Nevertheless, Feres' protection of military
discipline may be too broad, thus necessitating legislative examination. For example, one
judge reported the following exchange during oral argument-
The Court. [A]s I read the law, it doesn't matter if they stood up there and said
"one, two, three, left, right, left," and marched them over a cliff...
You'd be protected under Feres .. .?
[The Gov't]: Yes, your Honor.
Jaffee v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D.N.J.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 592 F.2d
712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); see James v. United States, 358 F. Supp.
1381, 1385 (D.R.I. 1973), aff'd mem., 530 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1976).
12M See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
140 (1953). See also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38-40 (1976).
124 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980) (quoting Huff v. Secretary of the Navy,
575 F.2d 907, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Tamm., J., dissenting in part), rev'd, per curiam, 444
U.S. 453 (1980)). Involved in Glines was a statute which prohibits anyone from "re-
strict[ing] any member of an armed force in communicating with a member of Congress"
unless national security is implicated. Id. at 349; see 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1976). Glines, a
member of the Air Force Reserves, wished to circulate petitions with respect to grooming
requirements, and then to send these signatures to various congressmen. 444 U.S. at 351. Air
Force regulations required that he obtain authorization from an appropriate officer in order
to distribute petitions on a base. Id. at 349-50. Although approval was not obtained, the
petitions were circulated on base and Glines was disciplined. Id. at 351. He brought suit
alleging violations of the first amendment and section 1034 of Title 10 of the United States
Code. Id. The Supreme Court not only sustained the Air Force regulations against first
amendment attack, but also construed section 1034 to permit such "restrictions" despite the
clear statutory language. The Court noted that the legislative purpose was to allow individ-
ual service personnel to communicate with congressmen. Id. at 358-59. The Air Force regu-
lations did not impair this right. The Court reasoned, however, that "[t]he unrestricted cir-
culation of collective petitions could imperil discipline." Id. at 360.
125 Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453, 458 (1980); accord, Brown v. Glines, 444
U.S. 348, 360 (1980).
2" See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
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"private bills were never a problem in the military, 12 7 it is clear
that the Feres Court was justified in reading a service-incident ex-
ception into the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity.
The propriety of such an interpretation of the FTCA also is
evidenced by the fact that, at the time of the Feres decision, a
strong governmental policy in favor of military autonomy ex-
isted.128 Consequently, it appears, one commentator has questioned
the continued viability of Feres in light of recent judicial limita-
tions upon such military autonomy.1 29 The commentator noted
that the Supreme Court has limited the jurisdiction of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice "to those subject to military discipline,
and then only if a crime is service-connected" since no military
necessity otherwise existed to justify military jurisdiction. 30 The
policies evidenced by such Supreme Court decisions, the commen-
tator suggested, are incompatible with the Feres rationale, because
they make significant inroads into the concept of military auton-
omy.131 These decisions, however, involved constitutional rights,
not legislative policy. 132 Moreover, even if these cases could be read
to indicate a congressional desire to limit military autonomy, Feres
would remain viable because the doctrine applies only to service-
127 See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 161 (1963); Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
,28 See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953), see Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S.
103, 111 (1950).
,'9 See Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 23, at 1113.
,30 Id. at 1115; see O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1956); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21-22 (1955).
,31 Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 23, at 1113.
131 See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261-62 (1969); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-
6 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21-22 (1955). In these cases, the
issue was whether Congress had the power to limit certain constitutional rights because of
military autonomy. See, e.g., 350 U.S. at 13-14. Feres, however, deals with congressional
intent and legislative policy. The difference is clear. Thus, these subsequent judicial pro-
nouncements respecting military autonomy are not persuasive in the context of service-inci-
dent tort claims. On the contrary, the Supreme Court's decision in Toth v. Quarles, for
example, addressed a congressional policy which favored yielding to concerns of military
discipline. The Toth case arose after Congress passed a law which subjected former military
personnel to court-martial jurisdiction when the misconduct complained of occurred while
the defendant was still a member of the Armed Forces. 350 U.S. at 13 & n.2. The Court
ruled that this law was unconstitutional, id. at 23, reasoning that "considerations of disci-
pline provide no excuse for new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the
normal and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury." Id. at 22-23 (footnote omit-
ted). Since the Feres doctrine is predicated solely upon congressional intent, it is suggested
that limitations on the considerations of discipline that are premised on constitutional
rights are inapposite.
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connected torts.13 3 Additionally, there is indeed a compelling mili-
tary necessity for barring nonmilitary adjudication of these claims,
namely, the potentially drastic effects upon military discipline.'"
The same commentator also placed weight upon the recent
tendency to permit judicial review of certain military administra-
tive decisions. 135 In such cases, a court is required to evaluate, in-
ter alia, the strength of the complaint, the likelihood that judicial
review will disturb the military function, and the degree of military
expertise implicated. 1' No such safeguards exist, however, regard-
ing a tort action brought under the FTCA. If military decisions are
exposed to judicial scrutiny without the benefit of such safeguards,
it is submitted that military discipline will be jeopardized. Thus, it
seems that this limitation upon military autonomy also has little
bearing upon the continued vitality of the Feres doctrine.
CONGRESSIONAL MODIFICATION OF THE Feres DOCTRINE
Notwithstanding criticisms that the Feres doctrine was inade-
quately supported, and that its continued application is questiona-
ble in light of more recent broad constructions of the FTCA,5 7 the
fact remains that Congress has not chosen to amend the Act to
allow service-incident claims by servicemen.'3 8 Indeed, the Feres
Court recognized that its interpretation of the Act was vulnerable
to attack, but cited the lack of legislative materials pertinent to the
question of military claims, and noted that if its construction were
131 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954).
13, It is suggested that it would be difficult to point out specific dangers regarding the
effect of FTCA suits on the command relationship. As Chief Justice Warren noted in an-
other context, "courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact on discipline that any par-
ticular intrusion upon military authority may have." Warren, The Bill of Rights and the
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 187 (1962). It has been recognized, however, that "[v]igor
and efficiency on the part of the officer and confidence among the soldiers are impaired if
any question be left open as to their attitude to each other." In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147,
153 (1890).
131 See Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 23, at 1116.
136 Id. at 1117; see Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1971). See gener-
ally Note, Judicial Review and Military Discipline-Cortright v. Resor: The Case of the
Boys in the Band, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 1048, 1054-62 (1972).
137 See note 105 supra.
'" Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1980); Troglia v. United
States, 602 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1979). The most recent proposal to amend the FTCA
was offered by Senator Kennedy. See S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 2919
(1979). The bill would allow claims against the United States for constitutional torts com-
mitted by government employees, and would substitute disciplinary proceedings for individ-
ual tort liability. Id.
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incorrect, Congress could remedy the situation." 9 Surely, the fact
that Congress has not overruled the Feres doctrine evinces its tacit
approval of the Feres bar to service-incident claims.1 40
Therefore, it is submitted that any attack on the Feres doc-
trine should be directed to Congress, not to the federal court sys-
tem. While the Supreme Court in the past has reinterpreted stat-
utes by overruling prior cases,141 the principle of stare decisis
indicates that this should be done with restraint-particularly
when Congress can correct an erroneous construction through
amendment of the statute in question.1 42 Additionally, it is not
139 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
140 United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053
(1969); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 771 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); accord, Jacoby, supra note 17, at 1283, 1301; Note, supra note 37, at 1222.
141 See, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) (overruling United States
v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929)). Justice Douglas once commented that it was a
"healthy practice" for the Court to examine its prior interpretations of statutes, and to dis-
card them if necessary. W. 0. DOUGLAS, STARE DEcisis 21 (1949). To support his view, the
Justice cited the democratic tradition and the fact that it is not easy to pass legislation
correcting judicial doctrine. Id.
142 Stare decisis is a rule of judicial policy which recognizes that a court is not bound by
its prior decisions, but will adhere to them in order to further certainty and stability in the
law. 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402, at 154-55 (2d ed. 1980). Justice Brandeis
found stare decisis to be the best course, "because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This principle is given even
greater weight when the prior decision construed a statute because the legislature has, in
effect, the power to overrule the court's interpretation. 1B J. MooR, supra, 1 0.402, at 291;
accord, Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Indeed,
some commentators assert that the judicial interpretation merges with the statute, effec-
tively creating an amendment. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 252-53 (1975); see, e.g., Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial
Supremacy, 25 Tzx. L. REv. 247, 250-51 (1947). This can be characterized as judicial legisla-
tion, but is justified as necessary to the judicial process. Id. If, however, a court reinterprets
the statute, overruling its previous decision, it is usurping the legislative function. See id. at
251 n.15. This view is not universally accepted because it assumes that the legislature stands
ready to examine all judicial decisions which construe statutes, and to amend acts which
they deem to have been incorrectly interpreted. See Rogers, Judicial Reinterpretation of
Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. Rxv. 611, 611-12
(1977). The Supreme Court itself has noted that "it is at best treacherous to find in congres-
sional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." Girouard v. United States, 328
U.S. 61, 69 (1946). More recent cases indicate, however, that the Court will generally yield
to the principle of stare decisis, and thus avoid overruling prior construction of statutes,
where Congress has not acted to amend. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,
736 (1977); Edwards v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 390 U.S. 538, 543 (1968).
One can argue, citing Girouard, 328 U.S. at 69, that it is tenuous to state that Congress,
by its silence, approves of the Feres doctrine. But see note 140 and accompanying text
supra. It is submitted, however, that it can be shown that Congress has at least acquiesced
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:485
clear that the Feres decision was incorrect, for its rationale com-
ports with the view that Congress did not intend service-incident
military claims to be cognizable under the FTCA.143 The effect of
such suits upon military discipline, the availability of veterans'
benefits, and the legislative purpose of reducing private bills, all
support the Feres holding.14 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court's later,
in the doctrine. The largest amount ever granted to an individual through a private enact-
ment was received by James R. Thornwell. Mr. Thornwell was a private in the Army in 1961
when he unknowingly became the subject of "Operation Third Chance," a program designed
to test the effectiveness of LSD as an aid to interrogation. Thornwell v. United States, 471
F. Supp. 344, 346 (D.D.C. 1979). Thornwell was "secretly drugged" and "subjected to...
physical and mental degradation" pursuant to the program. Id. Four months later, he was
discharged, but was not advised of his participation in the test until 1977. Id.; S. REP. No.
96-589, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980). He brought an action under the FTCA, alleging
various grounds for recovery, but those claims dealing with injuries occurring while he was
on active duty were dismissed under Feres. 471 F. Supp. at 348. The Senate Report consid-
ering passage of a private act to compensate Thornwell for his injuries contained a letter
from the Department of the Army, explaining that negotiations had reached an impasse
because the Feres doctrine constituted an unquestioned bar to compensation under the
FTCA. S. RP. No. 96-589, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980).
143 If one were to concede that some of the Feres rationale have been rendered inopera-
tive by subsequent cases, the "outlandish consequences" rationale could still justify the
Feres doctrine. The Brooks Court stated:
Interpretation of the same words may vary, of course, with the consequences, for
those consequences may provide insight for determination of congressional pur-
pose. The Government's fears may have point in reflecting congressional purpose
to leave injuries incident to service where they were, despite literal language and
other considerations to the contrary. The result may be so outlandish that even
the factors we have mentioned would not permit recovery.
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1949) (citation omitted). It is a well-known
canon of construction that courts cannot abandon the plain language of a statute to give it a
more desirable interpretation. E. CRAWFORD, supra note 92, § 168, at 266; R. DICKERSON,
supra note 142, at 231. Therefore, the Feres Court would have been "wrong" if it had im-
plied an exception for servicemen and justified it by stating that this was a better approach,
for there is no express exception in the language of the Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671,
2680 (1976). Of course, if consideration of only the express language of a statute would
create an absurdity, it is well settled that a court may "conclude that the legislature did not
mean what it expressly said." R. DICKERSON, supra note 142, at 232 (footnote omitted);
accord, E. CRAWFORD, supra note 92, § 177, at 288-90. The Brooks Court saw no absurdity in
allowing military claims unconnected with military service; therefore, it only needed to look
at the express language of the FTCA. See 337 U.S. at 52. Claims incident to service, how-
ever, could lead to an absurdity which would justify looking beyond the words of the stat-
ute. See id. at 52-53. If such were the case in Feres, the fact that its interpretation of the
private analogy language was subsequently questioned would be immaterial because the ab-
surd consequences would allow the Court to discount the language and look more closely at
legislative intent and purpose. See id.
144 It already has been demonstrated that the Feres holding can be justified by looking
to the absurd effect of FTCA suits upon military discipline. See note 143 supra. The availa-
bility of veterans' benefits also can lead to a finding that Congress did not intend service-
incident claims to be cognizable under the Act. Although the Supreme Court appeared to
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more liberal approach to the FTCA does not justify overruling
Feres as if it were a common-law immunity doctrine. Presumably,
it is a distillation of unswerving legislative intent. It is submitted,
therefore, that modification or elimination of the Feres doctrine is
a congressional, not a judicial, prerogative.
INCIDENT TO SERVICE: THE UNDEFINED DISTINCTION
Given that the Feres doctrine is in little danger of being over-
turned by the Supreme Court,145 and given that Congress has
shown no desire to legislate it out of existence, the appropriate def-
inition of the "incident to service" phrase assumes crucial impor-
tance. While the Supreme Court has termed this the "vital distinc-
reach a contrary conclusion in United States v. Muni, see 374 U.S. 150, 160 (1963); note
105 supra, this "was neither an issue in nor decided by" that case. United States v. Demko,
385 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1966). In Demko, the Court held that prisoners covered by the prison
compensation law are barred from FTCA recovery. See id. Muniz was found not to control
because it did not involve prisoners who were protected by any such law. Id. This appears to
indicate that Muniz did not mark a retreat from Feres' veterans' benefits rationale. The
Feres holding can also be supported through Justice Jackson's analysis of the legislative
purpose of the Act. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); note 70-72 and
accompanying text supra. The Tort Claims Act was only one part of the Legislative Reor-
ganization Act of 1946, and was developed as a time and laborsaving device. S. RP. No.
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946). Since military personnel had not been submitting pri-
vate bills, including them within the operation of the FTCA would not have an effect on
congressional time, and thus, would not further the legislative purpose. See Feres, 340 U.S.
at 140.
To ascertain legislative intent, courts may look to the meaning of the statute's language
as well as to the purpose of the enactment. E. CRAWFoRD, supra note 92, at § 160. The
absurd effects of a literal construction of a statute can color a court's view of the meaning of
a statute, see Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1949); note 143 supra, thus per-
mitting the conclusion that the express language of an act does not correctly reveal the
intent of the legislature, see note 143 supra. In such a case, legislative purpose becomes a
valuable guide to statutory interpretation. See R. DIcKaRsON, supra note 142, at 96; 2A J.
SUHERLmD, supra note 51, § 45.09, at 29. It is submitted that the factors involving veter-
ans' benefits, private bills, and the military relationship combine to justify the Peres holding
as a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent.
245 See Stencel Aero Eng'r Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1977). Notably,
several recent court of appeals decisions have adhered strictly to the Feres doctrine. In Jaf-
fee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Third Circuit rejected a
constitutional tort cause of action by military personnel because it would have circumvented
the Feres doctrine. Id. at 1236-37. In Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981),
the Ninth Circuit held that the Feres doctrine barred a suit against the government by a
serviceman whose cancer, which was caused in the course of military service, did not develop
until after such service. Id. at 132-33. Conversely, however, in Broudy v. United States, 661
F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit also held that the Feres doctrine would not bar a
suit against the government for recovery of postdischarge injuries caused by the negligent
failure of the government to monitor and inform a discharged serviceman of his predis-
charge exposure to nuclear radiation. Id. at 128.
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tion" between Brooks and Feres,146 its failure to define the term""
has resulted in inconsistent decisions by the lower courts.1 41
Surely, neither the Brooks, Feres, nor Brown opinions adequately
delineated the scope of the service-incident claim. Brooks taught
that an off-base injury unrelated to the complainant's army career
is clearly cognizable under the FTCA.149 Feres, in denying the
plaintiffs' FTCA claims as service incident, stressed the active duty
status of the complainants 5" and distinguished Brooks as involving
a claimant who was on furlough, off base, "under compulsion of no
orders or duty, and on no military mission.""51 The Feres Court,
however, did not identify any one of these factors as being deter-
minative. Finally, Brown distinguished the facts presented to the
Court from those of Feres as involving an injury "not incurred
while respondent was on active duty or subject to military
discipline."' 52
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
1, See note 16 and accompanying text supra. One court criticized the "incident to ser-
vice" standard by noting that "[i]t is so lacking in precision that the mere fact that the
plaintiff was in military service at the time of the accident can provide a logical basis for the
government's arguing for exclusion of the person concerned on a post hoc, ergo propter hoc
basis." Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969).
14 See notes 1-22 and accompanying text supra. Application of the Feres bar some-
times appears arbitrary. For example, if an Air Force plane crashes into a serviceman's pri-
vately owned home, he can recover damages under the FTCA, see United States v. Guyer,
218 F.2d 266, 267 (4th Cir. 1954) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Snyder v.
United States, 350 U.S. 906 (1955), unless he rents land inside a military base and puts his
home thereon, see Preferrred Ins. Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d 942, 948 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 837 (1955).
149 Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
150 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
151 Id. at 146.
151 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). Since the Supreme Court, in
Brown, emphasized that military discipline was a prime reason for the Feres doctrine, id. at
112, litigants have attempted to convince the lower courts that the service-incidence concept
should be limited to assessing whether a tort recovery would frustrate such discipline, see,
e.g., Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134, 139 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904
(1980); Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 815 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819
(1973). While at least one district court has accepted this proposition, stating that the inci-
dent to service inquiry should be limited to whether the particular suit would undermine
discipline, see Downes v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626, 628 (E.D.N.C. 1965), this ap-
proach has not gained general acceptance. Indeed, if disruption of military discipline were
the only criterion, it is submitted that the Feres plaintiffs may very well have recovered. Cf.
Coffey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d
1380 (9th Cir. 1972) (Feres did not involve specific disciplinary problems). The Supreme
Court never implied that the reach of Feres should be restricted by such a specialized read-
ing of its "incident to service" language. Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248, 1250
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
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The nebulous language and the varying factual situations
presented in Brooks, Feres, and Brown have rendered it difficult
for the lower courts to divine any guiding precepts for the interpre-
tation of incident to service and to determine the degree of empha-
sis that should be accorded each factor. Moreover, courts have en-
countered novel factual situations which do not fit neatly into the
fact patterns presented in either Brooks, Feres, or Brown.15 Sur-
veying this situation, one commentator has suggested that the best
course for the practitioner would be to look at all the facts
presented in the cases decided thus far and to compare them with
U.S. 1053 (1969). Also, this approach fails to account for those cases wherein the tortfeasor
and the injured party are members of different branches of the military. Although discipline
is not affected in such cases, the Feres doctrine nevertheless has been applied in this con-
text. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1012-13 (5th Cir. 1980); see Uptegrove v.
United States, 600 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1979). Finally, it is submitted that the effect
of this approach would be to unjustifiably elevate one of several articulated rationale, albeit
one of pivotal importance, to a position where it is the sole focus of the inquiry. Cf. Parker
v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1013 (5th Cir. 1980) (effect of particular suits on discipline
"is more relevant to the decision whether to imply an exception than it is to the exception's
application").
1s See Note, supra note 17, at 557-58. A number of cases have involved injuries in-
curred incident to service which have continuing effect after the serviceman's separation
from the military. See, e.g., Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 133-34 (9th Cir. 1981);
Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1981); In re "Agent Orange" Prod-
uct Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Thornwell v. United States,
471 F. Supp: 344, 347 (D.D.C. 1979); Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536, 539-40
(E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd on other grounds, 381 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1967). The results in these
cases depend upon how closely the facts parallel those presented in Brown. See notes 82-88
and accompanying text supra. If the claimant can show that the tort occurred after his
discharge, he will not be barred by Feres. See, e.g., Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d at
128; Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. at 539-40. If, however, there is no postdis-
charge tort, but merely one tort occurring before discharge which has continuing effects
after discharge, the claim will be barred. Thornwel v. United States, 471 F. Supp. at 352;
see, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. at 779. Cases
involving preinduction torts are similar to Brown and other postdischarge cases in that they
involve injured plaintiffs who are not members of the military at the time the injury occurs.
In Healy v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 958 (2d
Cir. 1961), for example, the plaintiff was examined by an Air Force doctor, was found physi-
cally qualified, and was inducted into the Air Force. 192 F. Supp. at 326. He alleged that the
doctor failed to diagnose a heart condition which became aggravated by the rigors of basic
training. Id. Healy attempted to distinguish Feres on the ground that he was a civilian at
the time of the negligent act. Id. The court held that Healy's claim was barred by Feres
because although the negligence occurred while the plaintiff was a civilian, the injury oc-
curred while the plaintiff was a serviceman. See id. at 328. The activity giving rise to that
injury was inescapably connected with military service, and thus, the claim was barred by
Feres. Id. Other cases dealing with preinduction torts have adopted the Healy analysis. See,
e.g., Joseph v. United States, 505 F.2d 525, 526-27 (7th Cir. 1974); Redmond v. United
States, 331 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (N.D. nl. 1971), aff'd mem., 530 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1976).
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the claim advanced to assess the probability that it will be adjudg-
ed service incident.1M The Eighth Circuit, in Miller v. United
States, 55 adopted a similar approach. The court found a general
trend among the federal courts to characterize an injury as one in-
curred incident to service if it occurs "(1) on a military base, or (2)
while the serviceman is on active duty status, or (3) under compul-
sion of military orders or on a military mission or directly subject
to military control, or (4) the activity is a privilege related to or
dependent upon military status. ' 156 The Miller court reasoned that
the "on base" and "active duty" situations should not be consid-
ered irrebuttable presumptions that an injury was service incident,
because this would needlessly expand the Feres doctrine.5 7 In-
stead, the court declared, the facts in each case should be closely
scrutinized to determine whether the activity engaged in was
"truly" incident to service.""' Although the panel decision in Miller
was reversed en banc, its suggestion that the situs of the tort or the
duty status of the serviceman should not be dispositive presents a
welcome change. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the Eighth Cir-
cuit has perpetuated the confusion in this area by invoking the
phrase "incident to service" without enunciating criteria for defin-
154 L. JAYSON, supra note 105, § 155.02 at 5-66, 5-67.
155 643 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd en bane, 643 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1981).
151 643 F.2d at 483 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). The Millei court further
noted that if the injury does not occur on a military base, and the serviceman is on leave
and not subject to any military control, and he is not taking advantage of some military
privilege, the claim will not be barred by Feres. See id. at 494. All of these factors must be
present, however, for the claim to be cognizable under the FTCA. Id. at 484.
151 See id. at 485. The court admitted that raising an impenetrable shield of "on base"
and "active duty" was attractive because of its simplicity. See id. at 485-86. Indeed, some
courts have adopted mechanical tests for this very reason. See, e.g., Hass v. United States,
518 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (4th Cir. 1975); Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 816 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973). The Ninth Circuit attempted to justify this ap-
proach by stating, "[t]his is a classic situation where the drawing of a clear line is more
important than being able to justify, in every conceivable case, the exact point at which it is
drawn." Id. at 816. It is interesting to note that the Ninth Circuit still appears ready to find
"on base" injuries incident to service, see Dexheimer v. United States, 608 F.2d 765, 766-67
(9th Cir. 1979); Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1979), but is willing
to look further into the serviceman's activity if the injury occurs on government-owned
"land" rather than on a "base" proper, see 602 F.2d at 1339. Indeed, this absolutist view is
unfortunate given that the court has expressed its displeasure with the Feres doctrine. See
Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1980). It is submitted that although
the circuits are bound by Feres, they should not feel so constrained in deciding how to apply
it, for the Supreme Court has never definitely established the meaning of the phrase "inci-
dent to service." See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
I See Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 486 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd en banc, 643
F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1981).
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ing the scope of the term. It was, after all, the vagueness of this
standard which resulted in the courts originally becoming em-
broiled in the on base/active duty dilemma.159
While grouping military injuries into the four categories of
"active duty," "on duty," "subject to military control," and "privi-
leged activity"160 is susceptible of simple application and, accord-
ingly, fosters judicial economy, it seems that more persuasive rea-
soning must be employed before judicial redress of a grievance
should be denied. It is submitted that the incident to service prob-
lem would be a less formidable obstacle if the inquiry focused pri-
marily upon the activity of the serviceman at the time of the in-
jury."1 Indeed, Feres states that military tort claims are not
cognizable under the FTCA if they "arise out of" activity or are
"in the course of" activity incident to service.162 The Sixth Circuit,
in Woodside v. United States,16 3 focused upon the activity of a ser-
viceman at the time of his injury in determining whether his
widow's FTCA claim should be barred.16 The court stated that for
189 The on base/active duty rules appear to have their genesis in some of the Feres
language. The Feres Court noted that the servicemen in that case were "on active duty and
not on furlough," Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950), while the Brooks service-
men were on furlough and driving on a public highway at the time of the injury, id. at 146.
The Ninth Circuit used this language to formulate its incident to service test. See Hen-
ninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973). The
Ninth Circuit later retreated from this position, indicating that it would find duty status
dispositive only in cases where the injury occurred "on base." See Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d
866, 868 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). See generally note 157 supra. In an early case, the
Fifth Circuit used the active duty/on base test to determine the applicability of Feres, see
Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1954), and thereafter consistently applied it
for 25 years, see, e.g., Mason v. United States, 568 F.2d 1135, 1136 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam). In a fairly recent case, however, the court expressed a desire to eliminate the dis-
positive effect of at least the "on base" test, see Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007,
1014 (5th Cir. 1980), but still strictly applies the duty status test, see Garrett v. United
States, 625 F.2d 712, 713-14 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1363 (1981). The Second
and Third Circuits also consistently find injuries incurred by servicemen on base while on
active duty barred by Feres. See, e.g., Camassar v. United States, 531 F.2d 1149, 1151 (2d
Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955, 957, (3d Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
160 See note 156 and accompanying text supra.
261 Notably, the Fifth Circuit has observed that "[c]ontrary to what one might expect,
inquiry into what function the service member was performing appears to be one of the last
questions considered." Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1013 (5th Cir. 1980).
162 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (emphasis added).
263 606 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
16 In Woodside, an Air Force captain was killed in an airplane crash. The decedent was
taking flying lessons for his own personal satisfaction-his military duties did not require
him to fly a plane. 606 F.2d at 136-37. Instruction was provided by an aviation club, main-
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a claim to be considered barred by Feres, "there must be some
proximate relationship between the service member's activity and
the Armed Forces. Where the two are closely associated or natu-
rally related, the activity will be deemed 'incident to service.' "165
It is submitted that this states an excellent test for gauging the
scope of Feres, for it avoids arbitrary "baseline" rules, and appears
easy to apply. In enunciating this test, however, the court indi-
cated that, generally, on base and active duty injuries would be
deemed incident to service.166 This is unfortunate because many of
the cases cited for support used the on base/active duty presump-
tions found objectionable by the Eighth Circuit in Miller.167 More-
over, the Woodside court failed to enunciate criteria for determin-
ing when a natural or closely proximate relationship between the
serviceman's activity and the Armed Forces comes into existence.
Without such criteria the "closely proximate relationship" test is
as nebulous as the incident to service test.
When determining whether an injury is incurred incident to
service, it is suggested that courts focus upon the nature of the
activity engaged in by the serviceman at the time of his injury and
examine whether the requisite proximate relationship exists be-
tween that activity and military service. In reaching that determi-
nation, rather than applying the attractively simplistic active duty
and on base presumptions, the courts should consider a number of
other factors.
First, the duty status, although not dispositive of the merits of
a case, should weigh heavily in the courts' deliberations. It should
not be determinative because it is easy to envisage situations where
a serviceman is injured while technically on duty or subject to mili-
tary discipline and engaged in an activity wholly unrelated to his
military service. The situation of Carvel Gramlich, described at the
beginning of this Note,168 is a poignant example of this anomaly.
To deny recovery in such an instance is to permit the fortuity of
tained at an Air Force base and supported by Air Force funds. Id. at 136. "Active" member-
ship was limited to active duty members of the Air Force. Id.
160 Id. at 141. The Woodside court noted that although the decedent was on leave and
not subject to military control, his widow's claim was barred by Feres. Id. at 142. The court
found the "link" between the activity of the decedent and the Air Force to be sufficient to
call the activity "incident" to military service. Id.
1C Id.
Compare Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 483-84 & nn.9-11 (8th Cir. 1980),
rev'd en banc, 643 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1981) with Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d at 142.
I" See notes 7-11 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 56:485
FERES DOCTRINE
the circumstances to govern, despite the undeniable fact that
Gramlich's activity-leaving his ship for an afternoon's shore
leave-was in no way connected to his military status or service,
except in the sense that "all human events depend upon what has
already transpired."16
Second, the location of the tort, while a factor to be weighed
by the court, should not carry great weight in its deliberations be-
cause of the danger that the prospect of recovery will be dependent
on the fortuity of the circumstances surrounding an accident. It is
difficult to justify a principle that translates into the reality that if
a serviceman is killed 10 feet inside a military base, there is a good
chance that his claim will be barred by Feres, but if he is killed 10
feet away from the military premises, recovery prospects improve
dramatically.
A third factor to be considered by the courts is whether the
injury arose from the serviceman's availing himself of a privilege
incident to military service. If the answer is affirmative, the court
should give serious consideration to applying the Feres bar, since
in this instance the activity is proximately related to military ser-
vice. Even in this situation, however, the court should not invoke
blindly the Feres bar. Rather, it is important that the court con-
duct a twofold inquiry: it must first determine whether the activ-
ity may be exercised solely by military personnel, or whether per-
mission is granted to civilian personnel; second, the court must
decide whether there is any military necessity that the victim have
engaged in the activity at issue. A negative answer to either of
these queries tends to divorce the activity from the military rela-
tionship and should lead the court to engage in a more thoughtful
consideration of all of the circumstances impinging upon the
injury.
Fourth, the court should consider the extent to which the ser-
viceman was acting under orders in engaging in the activity that
culminated in the accident. If he clearly was acting under orders,
then the claim unequivocally is barred by Feres, since maintenance
of the command/obedience nexus constitutes the core of the mfli-
tary relationship.1 70
Of course, it is inevitable that many more factors that bear on
the proximity of the serviceman's activity and the service relation-
169 See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
170 See notes 122-128 and accompanying text supra.
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ship will arise. For example, the role of a piece of military equip-
ment in bringing about the serviceman's injury may be a relevant
factor. Another such factor may be the question of whether the
tortfeasor belonged to the same branch of the Armed Forces as the
victim. The federal judiciary should not be hesitant in seeking out
new elements which serve to clarify this most nebulous of tests.
CONCLUSION
Military decisions often must be made at a moment's notice. It
may be inappropriate for military judgments and the situations
which occasion them to be examined in a court of law-not neces-
sarily because such decisions deal with sensitive topics-but be-
cause judicial scrutiny even of a simple negligence case may have
lasting effects which transcend the equities in a given case. Ser-
vice-incident claims may have a chilling effect on future military
judgments. This, coupled with other considerations of statutory in-
terpretation, was the essence of the Brooks-Feres-Brown trilogy.
Indeed, only Congress has the capacity to investigate the ef-
fects of service-incident claims upon the operation of the Armed
Forces. Moreover, only Congress can waive sovereign immunity,
and Feres demonstrates Congress' manifest failure to express an
unequivocal waiver in the context of service-incident claims.
Therefore, it is submitted that the time is ripe for Congress to ex-
amine the prospect of permitting military personnel to sue under
the FTCA for injuries arising out of service-incident activities.
Finally, if Congress finds that to allow such claims would be
unwise, or if it chooses not to act, the incident to service standard
should operate fairly so as to avoid needless application of the
Feres doctrine, while remaining true to its underlying principles.
As this Note has demonstrated, the best way to accomplish this
task is to focus upon the nature of the serviceman's activity with a
view to determining the proximity of the relationship between that
activity and military service.
Joseph J. Dawson
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